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## **Indonesia, the West and International Politics: A Survey of Indonesian Student Perceptions of Self and Others in International Relations**

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# Indonesia, the West and International Politics: A Survey of Indonesian Student Perceptions of Self and Others in International Relations

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## *Series Editors*

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## Abstract

Images and perceptions have long been topics of inquiry in social science and humanities, including International Relations (IR). As an established Political Science sub-discipline, IR has played an important role in the construction of images and perceptions through the (re)production of knowledge, which influences decision-making of governmental and private agencies. Directly exposed to knowledge of the discipline are IR students, who are trained to serve governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As part of a broader investigation of the concepts of the West in Asia,<sup>1</sup> this study examines IR students' perceptions through a self-completion questionnaire survey. Indonesia is chosen as country case study due to its increasing international role and status as Southeast Asia's largest and most populous country. In addition to conventional IR topics, such as security threat, identity and foreign policy, this study is also interested in the perceptions of Indonesia's relations with other countries, and more importantly with the West, which has been an important element in the country's domestic debates and foreign policy in the past decades. The results of this study provide important pieces of information for further qualitative examination of the construction of the West. As reflections of individual actors' subjectivities, they demonstrate contemporary divergent views on Indonesia's self-perception, as well as its external relations, diplomacy and foreign policy.

## Key words

Indonesia, international relations, perception, security, identity, the West

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## Introduction

Images and perceptions have long been topics of inquiry in social science and humanities, including International Relations (IR). As an established Political Science discipline, IR has arguably played an important role in the construction of images and perceptions through the (re)production of knowledge, which influences decision-making of governmental and private agencies. Intra-discipline debates, however, raise the question of what ideas, or sets of ideas (including images and perceptions) in IR, matter or may affect social and political actions such as foreign policy making. This study attempts to explore these questions through a perception survey among 277 International Relations (IR) students in Jakarta and Yogyakarta (Java), Makassar (South Sulawesi) and Samarinda (East Kalimantan) who are directly exposed to the production of knowledge in IR in Indonesia – Southeast Asia's largest and most populous country and home to the world's largest Muslim population. The survey results provide necessary preliminary information of the construction of the West in the country. Furthermore, they also reflect contemporary views of a specific group of actors on Indonesia's external relations, diplomacy as well as foreign and security policy.

In addition to conventional IR topics, such as threat perception, particular emphasis is placed upon the students' perceptions towards Indonesia's relations with other countries, and more importantly with the West in general, which has occupied an important place along with other imagined regions and centers of political and economic powers<sup>2</sup> in Indonesia's foreign policy discourse over the past decade. Although the reference to the West as an important Other in the construction of Indonesian identity is not a new phenomenon, it has become a central element in an effort to reinvent Indonesia's roles, positions and more importantly its Islamic and democratic identities in international politics.

The following section provides a theoretical background and an elaboration of the methodological approach upon which this study is built. In a subsequent section the survey results are presented, and the final section concludes with an analysis of the empirical data.

## Theoretical and methodological approaches

Much of the literature on the construction of identity and meaning normally focuses on historical narratives, signs and discourses. Even though such studies allow for an examination of *how* the Self, Others, and social identities are discursively constructed and become social reality (Doty 1996, Todorova 1997, Neumann 1999), it often fails to explain whether and to what extent discourse impacts its discursive audience, who possess agency to choose from multiple conflicting discourses, interpreting discursive experiences, and forming identities of themselves and the others (McNay 2000). This agency is most explicit in terms of identification. Based on the notions of identification below, this study adopts a random self-completion questionnaire survey as a research method. The results of the survey allow for an evaluation of various discourses, including those in IR.

### *Image, perception and identification*

As part of a broader investigation of the construction of the West in Indonesia, this study relies on the concept of image, which is closely related to perception, identity and

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2 See Schlehe et al. (2013) and Schlehe (2013).

identification. Images can be defined as *gestalt* or descriptive constructs that, together with other cognitive elements such as beliefs and motivations, constitute an actor's perception and view of the world (Herrmann 2003). They are also an integral part of identity formation that emerges out of social interaction and the representation of one's self-image and the reception by others of that presentation" (Jenkins 2008: 93). The reception of identification gives rise to the notion of "public image" (*ibid.*).

The concepts of self-image and collective public image of collective actors in intergroup relations – e.g. between Indonesians and others – are similar to those of individuals, but entail different dynamics as they are formed through both intra- and inter-group processes. Government-sponsored nation building, for example, may be considered an intra-group process that induces a collective, national self-identification. Such identification normally involves a construction of identities and the processes of defining national goals and national role conceptions (Holsti 1970). Although the government may have control over the messages they send, they have markedly less control over how these messages are received and interpreted by citizens (Jenkins 2008: 42). This disjuncture between the intended and actual reception of messages has been recognized and examined by IR scholars (Jervis 1976, Goonasekera & Jin 2002, Alexander et al. 2005, Wagner 2005, and Holland et al. 2007 and 2009). An example is the current perceptions towards the U.S. in some countries, including those in Southeast Asia. The U.S. government has adopted democracy as part of its "American manhood" identity and distinguished itself from the brutal European colonizers since the turn of the 20th century (Doty 1996: 30). Contemporary public images of the U.S. in Indonesia are, however, the opposite, as "platitudes of democracy" are offset by an image of the "rampaging armed forces" (Bond and Simons 2009: 90).

Even though identity, image and identification are closely intertwined, it must be noted that not every identification and image is associated with social identity. Rather, images and identification are related to "social positioning," which refers to dynamic and context-based identification of individuals' multiple selves (Davies & Harré 1990). The images of "ally" and "enemy," which are powerful reference categories in IR, for example, only describe a perceived position, or quality, of an actor in a particular social relation. Although they may suggest some level of compatibility or conflict between parties, they do not necessarily signify any role conception or social identity. Besides, as Potter and Reicher (1987: 25-6) note, "individuals may identify themselves [and others] with any one of a range of categories," or vocabularies, which exist in their linguistic repertoire and may be "drawn upon in discourse to buttress particular versions of conflict and influence."

This survey study relies heavily on the notions of identification that is related to both identity and social positioning. It must be emphasized that identification (or survey responses) examined in this survey only reflect the respondents' perceptions and preferences among various categories and positions. They do not represent the Indonesian government's actual foreign policy, which unfolds with complex processes of negotiation at various levels. IR theories, which are divided along basic assumptions, ontology and epistemology are also treated in this study as categories of intellectual perspectives that may influence the perceptions of the respondents. For example, preferences for pessimistic theories such as political realism, which highlight human selfishness, wars and conflicts, should lead to suspicion and negative perceptions towards other actors in international politics. By contrast, preferences for more optimistic theories, including those in the so-

called Liberal School of thought which stress the opportunities for cooperation and coexistence, should result in a more moderate view towards other actors.

### *Survey questions and procedures*

The survey comprises thirty-three open and close-ended questions, many of which are based on different types of ranking and rating scales (See Appendix I). The first half of the survey questions focuses on the public images of Western Others, including the European Union and the United States, which have continuously identified themselves as members of the West in international politics. In contrast, the second half seeks to assess the images the respondents hold for their own country (internal collective identification). Taken from policy debates in Indonesia, the response options in the second section represent the ideas promoted by different domestic groups and individuals. Since one of the objectives of this study is to obtain preliminary quantitative data for further qualitative examination on political thought in Indonesia, questions regarding Indonesian IR thinkers are included.

So as to minimize bias and misunderstanding, the questionnaire was prepared in Indonesian and was tested prior to distribution. The preparation and distribution were done by the researchers from Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg<sup>3</sup> and eight Indonesian IR lecturers<sup>4</sup> from four Indonesian universities: Universitas Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta, Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) in Yogyakarta (Central Java), Universitas Mulawarman (UNMUL) in Samarinda (East Kalimantan) and Universitas Hasanuddin (UNHAS) in Makassar (South Sulawesi), respectively. For convenience reasons, the questionnaires were distributed during IR classes at the four universities between February and April 2012.

Of all the 277 respondents, about 58.12% are female, and 41.88% are male. The Muslim students make up the largest group (82.3%), followed by Christian students (10.83%). Based on ethnicity, the Javanese and Buginese constitute about 33.6% and 15.5% of the respondents, respectively. Respondents from thirty-six other ethnic groups took part in the survey, according to the students' self-identification, including Acehnese, Ambonese, Banjar, Balinese, Batak, Betawi, Bima, "Celebes", Chinese, Dayak, Makassar, Mandarese, Malay, Manado, Minangkabau, "Palembang", Papua, Paser, "Sumatran", "Ternate", Torajan, and Sundanese.<sup>5</sup> About 94% of the respondents are between 18 and 24 years old, while the other 2.7 % and 2.9 % are between 14 and 17, and between 25 and 30 respectively. The smallest group based on age range is those over 30, who account for only 1.1%.

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3 The questionnaire was prepared through a collaboration between the author from Department of Political Science and two colleagues from the Department of Anthropology, namely Melanie V. Nertz and Vissia Ita Yulianto.

4 Aninda Rahmasari (UI), Asiyah (UNMUL), Burhanuddin (UNHAS), Frentika Wahyu A. (UNMUL), Kinanti Kusumawardani Wicaksono (UI), Nur Isda (UNHAS), Pusparida Syahdan (UNHAS), and Rochdi Mohan (UGM).

5 The students' identification of "places" such as Palembang, Sumatra, Ternate and Celebes as their ethnicity may be caused by their unwillingness to reveal their ethnic identity, or their unclear identity as a result of the parents' inter-ethnic marriage. The use of the word "Celebes," which was used by the Dutch colonizer to refer to Sulawesi, also reflects the lingering legacy of colonization on the students' self-identification.

## Survey Results

### *Ideas about the West*

According to the student responses to question no. 3 (*What are the five things that come into your mind when you hear or see the word “the West”?*), more than 170 items are identified, including English language, education, Caucasoid, culture, domination, globalization, Great Power, hegemony, Hollywood, individualism, industry, intervention, pop-culture, (political) realism, McDonald’s, mobility, sophistication<sup>6</sup>, stability, war on terrorism, wealth, welfare, weather, world police, and world order. While many of these items are synonyms or related to one another in some ways, others are identified repeatedly by several respondents, reflecting the salience of certain images and ideas. Among the most frequently identified items are America, Europe, capitalism, colonization, democracy, development, human rights, modernity, strong military, technology, liberalism and “free” (see Table 1.7).

*Table 1: Ideas most frequently associated with the West*

<b>Identified items</b>	<b>Number of respondents</b>	<b>Percentage of respondents</b>
America	95	34.3
Liberalism	91	32.8
Development	84	30.3
Democracy	80	28.9
Capitalism	76	27.4
Modern	70	25.3
Technology	61	22.0
Europe	50	18.1
Free	40	14.4
Colonization	33	11.9

Although “America” is most frequently identified, “Europe”, regardless geopolitical distinctions (Western, Central and Eastern) surpasses the “US” and “America” in the students responses to question no. 4 (*Please identify countries or regions that are parts of the West*) (see Table 2 below). A number of European countries are recognized as members of the West (i.e. UK, France and Germany) more often than Australia, Canada, and Scandinavian countries. Outside Europe, countries that are perceived as part of the West – albeit seldom – include Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Japan, Mexico, and Russia. This may reflect a rare application of racial and cultural traits (such as religion and language), political alignment, or the level of economic development as criteria for identification of the West.

<sup>6</sup> The Indonesian term identified is *canggih*, which can be literally translated as “sophisticated”.

<sup>7</sup> The term “free” is a translation of the term *bebas* in Indonesian language.

*Table 2: Identified Members of the West*

<b>Regions and countries</b>	<b>Percentage of respondents</b>
Europe	59.9
US	52.3
America	46.6
UK	35.4
France	25.6
Germany	21.7
Australia	11.2
Russia	5.8
Mexico	1.8
Argentina	1.1
Japan	1.1
Israel	0.7

### *Relations with Indonesia*


The responses to the question of whether the West poses a threat or an opportunity to Indonesia (question no. 5) are rather mixed. Contrary to the much-publicized anti-West sentiment in Muslim countries, only one-fifth or 19.1% of the respondents perceive the West as a threat. The majority, or 52% of the respondents are rather uncertain whether the West is an opportunity or a threat. According to them, the answer to this question depends largely on Indonesia's position, particularly on its capability which varies across a range of issues-areas. Another 28.2% see the West as an opportunity, especially in terms of knowledge and technological transfer and economic cooperation. In brief, the students' negative perceptions towards the West are caused by the views that Western culture and values are incompatible with Indonesian cultures, while others mentioned colonial exploitation and Western economic and military domination.

*Table 3: The West in relations with Indonesia*

<b>The West as opportunity or threat?</b>	<b>No. of respondents</b>	<b>Percentage of respondents</b>
Opportunity	78	28.2
Threat	53	19.1
Undecided	144	52.0
Missing data	2	0.7

## The West and international cooperation

Graph 1: The West and areas of international cooperation  
Percentage of respondents to survey



Responses to question no. 6, (Please identify three issues-areas in which the West is most cooperative, 1 being most cooperative, 2 being less cooperative, and 3 being least cooperative) demonstrate that the West is perceived as most cooperative in international trade, followed by democratization and terrorism (see Graph 1 below). In the areas of environment, management of financial crisis and military, however, the West is seen as least cooperative. In human rights and human security, the responses are mostly divided. The percentages of the respondents who perceive the West as most cooperative and least cooperative in this area are about the same, namely 8.3% and 8.66%.<sup>8</sup> It must be noted that many responses to this question are invalid due to unclear rating. The percentages of non- and invalid responses are combined and represented as missing data.


### The West as models

Even though the West is not always seen as cooperative, European integration is often cited as a “model” or “inspiration” for regional cooperation and integration, including that of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (CFR 2008, Jetschke 2009). The highly publicized financial crisis in the Eurozone may have some impact on the students’ perceptions toward the EU model of regional integration. According to the responses to question no. 8 (“ASEAN should follow the European Union model of integration.” Do you agree with this statement?), about one third of the students (33.2%) disagree with the statement that ASEAN should follow the EU model of regional integration.

<sup>8</sup> The responses to question no. 7, which asks the respondents to identify the issue areas in which cooperation with the West cannot be sought, are in line with responses to question no. 6. Cooperation with the West in the area of environment is perceived as most difficult, followed by the management of financial crisis, and military cooperation. In responding to this question no. 7, the students may choose more than one issue-area.

And while only 13.4% agree with the statement, the majority of the respondents (52%) prefer a modified version of the EU model.<sup>9</sup>

*Graph 2: The West as Models  
Percentage of students' responses*



An image of the West is perhaps most positive in terms of technological development, as the responses to question no. 10. indicate (*Do you think the West can be a model for Indonesia's technological development?*). About 94.2% of the respondents regard the West as a model for Indonesia's technological development. The responses, however, are divided when the students are asked whether they think Western economic development can be a model for Indonesia in question no. 9. While 51.2% of the responses were positive, 48% disagree. The opposing view may indeed be a result of the identification of the West with "capitalism," which, as noted earlier, is associated with the West and generally has a negative connotation in normal usage.

### *Indonesia's relations with Australia, China, the EU and the US*

*Table 4: Perceived relations of Indonesia and the Australia, EU, China and the US  
Percentage of students' responses*

Partners	very good	good	mediocre	bad	very bad	Missing data
China	9.39	54.87	29.96	5.42	0.36	-
Australia	7.94	41.52	42.24	7.94	0.36	-
EU	1.08	33.57	63.54	1.44	0.36	-
US	1.08	40.43	52.35	4.69	1.08	0.36

Indonesia's relations with major Western powers are perceived as relatively positive. Although 64.2% of the students agree that the West dominates international politics in their responses to question no. 15 (*Do you think international politics is currently dominated by Western countries?*), and 97.1% agree that Indonesia is vulnerable to Western influence (question no. 30: *Do you think Indonesia is vulnerable to Western influence?*), such perceptions

<sup>9</sup> The data may be an indication of the continuation of "Normative Power Europe," which, despite conceptual problems and criticisms, implies the EU's ideological influence on the evolution of other regional organizations, including ASEAN (Manners 2002).

do not result in a perception of uncordial relations between Indonesia and the EU and the US. Indeed, as data in Table 4 demonstrates, over 90% of the respondents display neutral and positive perceptions towards relations between Indonesia, on the one hand, and the EU and the U.S., on the other (questions no. 11 and 12). Their attitude towards Indonesia's relations with Australia is also similar (question no. 13). Significantly, Indonesia's relations with China are seen as most positive.

### *Sources of knowledge about the West and international politics*

The majority of the students (247) identify internet as the most important source of knowledge about the West in question no. 16 (*From what sources does your knowledge about the West come?*).<sup>10</sup> Internet is followed by television (with 198 identifications), films (184), newspapers (182), and university lectures (161). It must be noted that the identification of internet only reflects the respondents' media consumption. As many newspapers and TV channels also have their own websites, some contents appearing on internet may duplicate those on TV and newspapers.

*Table 5: Most popular newspapers and online news websites*

<b>Newspapers</b>	<b>No. of respondents</b>
Kompas	170
Newsdetik.com	119
Jakarta Post	36
Tempo	30
Kaltim Pos	18
Yahoo.com	12
Viva News	10
Fajar	9
Tribune Timur	7
Okezone.com	7
BBC	7
Others	77

The most popular newspapers and news websites read by the students are *Kompas*, *newsdetik.com*, and *The Jakarta Post*. Based on data on the respondents' news consumption in Table 5 below, although the students have relatively good English proficiency,<sup>11</sup> very few students regularly access international English-language media such as BBC and CNN. Moreover, although university lectures are not the most important source of knowledge about the West, they provide significant knowledge about international politics (question no. 17: *From what sources does your knowledge about international politics come? Please rank your answers on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being the most important and 5 being the least important*).

<sup>10</sup> Respondents might identify more than one source.

<sup>11</sup> IR is among the most popular academic disciplines in Indonesia. Above average English proficiency is normally a requirement for admission.

Table 6: Sources of knowledge about international politics

Sources	1	2	3	4	5
Lectures	46.2	17.0	17.3	10.1	2.5
TV	18.4	22.4	28.5	12.6	11.2
Newspapers	12.3	27.4	29.6	19.1	5.4
Internet	10.8	7.2	1.8	6.1	7.6
Films	3.6	16.6	12.6	36.1	23.1
Books	1.8	1.8	1.1	1.1	1.4
Discussions with other people	1.8	1.4	1.1	1.4	5.4
Others	1.8	0.4	0.4	2.2	15.9
Missing Data	3.2	5.8	7.6	11.2	27.4

### *IR theories and contemporary Indonesian thinkers*

Of all IR theories, Political Realism is regarded by almost half of the respondents as the most convincing paradigm<sup>12</sup> (question no. 18: *What theories or paradigms do you think can best explain international relations and international politics? If your choice is more than one, please elaborate on your answer briefly*<sup>13</sup>). Additionally, a significant number of students chose liberalism and constructivism. More importantly, many students identify realism along with Marxism, feminism, post-structuralism and post-modernism.<sup>14</sup> As these theories do not share basic assumptions or epistemology, the identification of multiple theories may indeed indicate an ambivalence in the students' attitudes, a lack of knowledge on IR theories, or unclear preference for a theory in interpreting international politics.

Table 7: Most convincing IR theories and paradigms of thought

IR theories and paradigms	No. of respondents
Realism	137
Liberalism	104
Constructivism	47
Feminism	7
Marxism	22
Post-structuralism	7
Post-modernism	11
Others	8

### *Indonesia in the eyes of the international community*

According to the responses to question no. 22 (In your opinion, what is the image of Indonesia in the international community? If your answer is more than one, please rank the three most important images – 1 being the most important, 2 second most important, and 3 least important), Indonesia's most important public image is that of a developing country (identified by 33.6% of the respondents). This image is consistent with the formal status of Indonesia according to the United Nations (UN) and other multilateral forums. Other images which the Indonesian government is trying to promote, including those of

12 The term "paradigm" employed here resembles that of a school of thought, or a group of theories that share certain basic assumptions. In this paper, the term "paradigm" and "theory" are used interchangeably.

13 Students may choose more than one theory.

14 For example, of the 137 students who choose realism, 41 also identify other theories, including liberalism, constructivism etc. as convincing paradigms.

“moderate Islam”, “leader of Southeast Asia”, and “emerging power” are not seen as prominent. And despite the publicized terrorist activities in the country, very few respondents believe that the international community identifies Indonesia with “terrorist/radical Islam”, or as a “threat.” Other attributes of Indonesia, including being friendly, having a promising economic potential, and being conflict-prone, are ranked second, third, and fourth, respectively (see Table 8).

*Table 8: Indonesia’s public images*  
Percentage of respondents’ perception of Indonesia’s public image in the eyes of the international community

<b>Images of Indonesia</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Developing country	33.6	17.3	11.2
Friendly	22.7	8.3	9.4
Having big economic potentials	10.1	14.1	7.6
Conflict prone	8.7	12.3	9.0
Moderate Islam	6.9	7.6	4.3
Terrorist/radical Islam	5.4	5.8	8.7
Leader of Southeast Asia	3.6	3.6	6.1
Emerging power	1.4	3.6	4.3
Threatening	-	1.4	7.2
Others	0.7	1.1	2.5
Missing Data	6.9	24.9	29.6

### *Indonesia’s foreign and security doctrines*

The responses to question no. 23 (In your opinion, which foreign policy principle of Indonesian is the most important of all time? If your answer is more than one, please rank the three most important principles, 1 being the most important, 2 being the second most important, and 3 being the third most important) shows that “bebas-aktif” (“independent and active”)<sup>15</sup> is regarded as the most important foreign policy principle (58.5% of the respondents, see Table 9 below). The data support Suryodiningrat’s (2011) observation that the principle has been a defining element “of what Indonesia is” in IR. Ranked second is “diplomasi perjuangan” (“diplomacy of struggles”), which was chosen by 22.4% of the students.<sup>16</sup> Although bebas-aktif is closely related to “non-alignment” and “zero-enemy” within the governmental discourses, the latter two are not considered the core principles of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

<sup>15</sup> *Bebas-aktif* was first coined by Indonesia’s first Vice President, the late Mohammad Hatta, in 1948 and has been included in Indonesia’s standard foreign policy textbooks ever since.

<sup>16</sup> Like *bebas-aktif*, *diplomasi perjuangan* also emerged during Indonesia’s struggles for Independence (See, for example, Mulyana 2011).

Table 9: Indonesia's most important foreign policy doctrines<sup>17</sup>  
Percentage of respondents

Foreign policy doctrines	1	2	3
Bebas-aktif (autonomous and active)	58.5	13.7	3.6
Diplomasi-perjuangan (diplomacy of Struggle)	22.4	15.9	9.0
Non-alignment	6.1	12.3	7.2
Zero enemy	5.1	7.6	15.9
Lingaran konsentris (concentric circle)	2.5	4.7	8.7
Others	0.7	-	-
Missing data	4.7	45.8	55.6

Regarding the security doctrines, the concept of *ketahanan nasional* (national resilience)<sup>18</sup> is ranked first, with 134 identifications (48.4% of the respondents) in the responses to question no. 24 (*In your opinion, which defense and security principles are most important? 1 is being most important, 2 being second most important, and 3 being third most important*). The concept is followed by the principle *wawasan nusantara* (archipelagic outlook)<sup>19</sup> and *Sistem pertahanan dan keamanan rakyat semesta* (Total People's Defence and Security System).<sup>20</sup> Other principles, including *lingaran konsentris* (concentric circle)<sup>21</sup> together with *pertahanan melingkar* (military district or *Wehrkreis*)<sup>22</sup> barely make up 6 % as the most important security doctrine.

17 It must be noted that although the principles as listed in Table 9 above may overlap with one another in some aspects, their historical usages and connotations are distinguishable.

18 *Ketahanan nasional* is an inward-looking security concept that aims to tackle domestic sources of national insecurity. Covering the ideological, socio-political, economic as well as technological and cultural aspects of the country, it promotes self-reliance rather than alliances or great power guarantees (Sebastian 2006, 11-2).

19 *Wawasan nusantara* was introduced in 1957 to promote the unity of Indonesia as one political, economic and security entity. It can be seen as an approach to nation-building and development in general. The security aspect of this concept is "to advance the security of Indonesian territorial waters" (Anwar 1999, 199). See also Mulder (2005, 112-3).

20 As a territorial defense concept, *sistem pertahanan dan keamanan rakyat semesta* or *Sishankamrata* is based on an idea of a revolutionary or guerrilla warfare, within which the entire nation is involved and with the professional military at the center (Anwar 1999, 126).

21 *Lingaran konsentris* can be seen as doctrine that reflects Indonesia's approach to both national security and foreign relations. As an idea it can be traced back to the ancient concept of *mandala*, a model of political organization, by which the political power concentrates in the core of the overlapping "circles of kings" (Wolters 1999, 27). In contemporary usage, it refers to a worldview, within which the ASEAN region is the first geopolitical circle, an area of utmost importance in Indonesia's international cooperation and foreign relations. The second circle includes the ASEAN+ 3 region as well as Indonesia's strategic partners, namely the EU and US, while the third circle comprises "like-minded developing countries" (MFA Indonesia 2009). Cooperation within these circles should be vehicle for Indonesia's national development, stability and peace.

22 *Pertahanan melingkar*, known also as *lingkaran pertahanan*, is a military tactic. According to Widjanto and Wardhani (2008, 62), the concept was an adaptation of the German *Wehrkreis* system employed during World War II. Based on the mobilization of the civilians and other resources within each district, it also incorporated many elements of guerrilla warfare.

Table 10: Most important defense and security principles  
Percentage of respondents

Defense and security principles	1	2	3
Ketahanan nasional (national resilience)	48.4	24.9	3.2
Wawasan nusantara (archipelagic outlook)	23.8	20.6	14.1
Sistem pertahanan dan keamanan rakyat semesta (total people's defense and security system)	16.6	14.1	22.7
Lingaran konsentris (concentric circle)	2.2	4.0	7.6
Pertahanan melingkar (military district/ <i>Wehrkreis</i> )	2.9	2.5	8.7
Others	0.4	-	0.4
Missing data	5.8	33.9	43.3

### Indonesian thinkers

Although *bebas-aktif* and *ketahanan nasional* are identified as the most important foreign and security principles, few students identify Mohammad Hatta and Soeharto (who are often associated with the two principles) as politicians with greatest influence in Indonesia's foreign relations in question no. 19 (*In your opinion, which Indonesian politician has the greatest influence on Indonesia's foreign relations? If your answer is more than one, please rank three most influential politicians, 1 being the most influential, 2 being the second most influential, and 3 being the third most influential*). In Table 11 below, Indonesia's first President, Soekarno, is indeed regarded as the most important thinker in the field. Other politicians, such as the late foreign ministers Ali Alatas, Sutan Sjahrir, Haji Agus Salim, and Abdurrahman Wahid, are identified by only about 10% of the students altogether.

The incoherent data on the identification of the most important foreign policy principles in Table 9 and that of influential politicians in Table 11 might be a result of the connotation of the term "politician" used in question no. 19. The term is normally reserved, although not exclusively, for figures with a clear political track record in the government. Hence, national figures (*tokoh nasional*), such as Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, and Abdurrahman Wahid may be considered less of a politician than Soekarno and Soeharto. Indeed, among Indonesians Hatta and Sjahrir are generally perceived more as student activist-turned-bureaucrats, while Wahid is often considered more of a Muslim cleric given his prominent religious background at the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).<sup>23</sup> Soekarno's distinguished military career during decolonization and later as Indonesia's first President may have thus resulted in widespread recognition that he was an exceptionally influential "politician", especially since important foreign policy doctrines, including *bebas-aktif*, *diplomasi-perjuangan* and non-alignment, were first developed during his era.

<sup>23</sup> I wish to thank Aninda Rahmasari for clarifying the issue of connotation and the possibility to interpret question no. 19 in different ways.

Table 11: Most influential politicians in Indonesia's foreign relations  
Percentage of respondents

Politicians	1	2	3
Soekarno	71.8	7.2	2.9
Hatta	11.2	23.8	5.1
Ali Alatas	4.0	10.8	9.4
Sutan Sjahrir	2.2	4.7	6.1
Haji Agus Salim	1.8	5.1	5.1
Soeharto	1.4	1.4	1.1
Abdurrahman Wahid	1.1	6.5	10.5
Tan Malaka	0.7	5.1	5.8
Soebandrio	-	-	3.2
Hasyim Djalal	-	0.7	2.2
Others	0.4	0.7	2.9
Missing Data	5.4	33.9	45.8

### Indonesia's identities

To some extent, data from Table 11 above coincide with the responses to question no. 25 (What do you think should be the international identity of Indonesia? If your answer is more than one, please rank three principles that are more important, 1 being most important, 2 being less important, and 3 being least important) (see Table 12 below). The late President Soekarno is recognized as the first Indonesian leader to promulgate Pancasila (five principles)<sup>24</sup>, which is identified by 43.7% of the respondents as their most favored identity for Indonesia at the international level. Despite frequent references to multiculturalism, Islam, and democracy in the Indonesian government's policies, these identities come second, third and fourth in the ranking, respectively.

Table 12: Indonesia's international identities  
Percentage of respondents

Identities	1	2	3
Pancasila	43.7	10.8	17.0
Multiculturalism	26.4	22.4	4.7
Islam	13.0	10.1	12.6
Democracy	8.7	18.1	11.2
Emerging power from Asia	2.2	5.4	9.4
Secularism	0.7	2.2	8.3
Others	-	0.4	-
Missing data	5.4	30.7	36.8

Although Islam and democracy do not constitute the most favorable international image, they nevertheless have a significant impact on the respondents' self-image and identification. In the responses to questions no. 26 (*Do you think "liberal democracy" is part of*

<sup>24</sup> Introduced by Soekarno in 1945, *Pancasila* is incorporated in the 1945 Constitution and is seen as a philosophical and ideological foundation of the Indonesian state. Since its introduction, many scholars and thinkers have sought to provide their own interpretation of the philosophy. In brief, the concept comprises five principles, namely (1) belief in the one and only God; (2) just and civilized humanity; (3) unity of Indonesia; (4) democracy guided by consultation and consensus, and; (5) social justice for all the Indonesian people. See Sukarno (2009) and Morfit (1981).

the Indonesian culture?), 59.6% of the students see liberal democracy as part of the Indonesian culture. The other 39.7%, however, disagree and instead prefer other political ideologies or systems, such as modified forms of democracy, including *Pancasila* democracy (49 students), guided democracy (15 students), and social democracy (9 students) (question no. 27: *If your answer to question no. 26 is no, what political system do you think is appropriate for Indonesia?*).

### *Principles of the Indonesian state*

Table 13: *Principles of Indonesian state*

<b>Basic principles of Indonesian states</b>	<b>No. of respondents</b>
Negara kesatuan (Unitary state )	118
Musyawah-mufakat (Consultation and consensus)	103
Gotong royong/kekeluargaan (Mutual assistance/kinship)	86
Multiculturalism	77
Others	24

The responses to question no. 28 (*Which principle do you think should be the foundation of the Indonesian state?*)<sup>25</sup> support the apparent preference for the *Pancasila* identity. According to data in Table 13, the idea of *negara kesatuan* (unitary state) is most often seen as the basic principle of the Indonesian state. It is followed by the principles of *musyawarah-mufakat* (consultation-consensus) and *gotong royong/kekeluargaan* (mutual assistance/kinship)<sup>26</sup>. As both *negara kesatuan* and *musyawarah-mufakat* constitute the third and fourth principles of *Pancasila*, the identification of the two can be an indication of the salience of the latter.

### *Threats and security problems*

The invention of *Pancasila*, security concepts such as *ketahanan nasional* and political discourses such as *negara kekeluargaan* (familial state) were meant to support the social cohesiveness and unity of the (nascent) Indonesian nation-state for at least half a century after the proclamation of Indonesia's independence in 1945. This implies that Indonesian leaders perceived national disunity and disintegration as the most significant threats facing Indonesia. The responses to question no. 29 (*In your opinion, what is the most serious security problem or threat Indonesia is facing? If your answer is more than one, please rank the problems, on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being the most important, 5 being the least important*), however, suggest that there is indeed a disjuncture between the official discourses and the respondents' perceptions in the area of security. As Table 14 below demonstrates, corruption is considered by more than 60% of the respondents as the most serious threat Indonesia is facing. National disintegration and terrorism come second and third respectively. The issue of Great Power intervention, one of the major traditional security concerns in IR, comes in only fourth in the ranking.

<sup>25</sup> Students may choose more than one principle.

<sup>26</sup> During the Soeharto era, the concept of *gotong royong* is integrated in the *negara kekeluargaan* (familial state) discourse. Although the concepts of *gotong royong* and *negara kekeluargaan* are distinguishable, the two are presented together as one category to represent a specific discourse.

Table 14: Indonesia's most serious threat and security problems  
Percentage of respondents

Security threats	1	2	3	4	5
Corruption	62.1	13.7	6.5	2.5	1.8
National disintegration	8.3	14.4	11.6	10.1	4.3
Terrorism	7.9	18.8	15.5	10.8	8.7
Great power intervention	5.8	9.7	12.6	12.3	6.1
Natural disasters	3.2	9.7	10.5	10.5	7.6
Globalization	3.2	9.4	8.3	7.2	12.3
Malaysia	0.7	1.4	3.2	3.6	9.4
Violation of Human Rights	0.4	4.7	10.5	7.2	9.0
Australia	-	0.4	0.4	0.4	3.2
Others	0.7	0.7	0.7	-	0.4
Missing Data	7.6	17.0	20.2	35.4	37.2

### *Globalization as an opportunity or a threat?*

That globalization is not seen as a major threat in Table 14 is confirmed by the responses to question no. 33 (*Do you consider globalization as an opportunity or threat to Indonesia? Please briefly elaborate.*). Of the 277 respondents, 170 (61.4%) regard globalization as an opportunity to Indonesia, while eighty-nine (32.1%) consider it as a threat. Another fourteen respondents (5%) are uncertain about globalization and its repercussions on Indonesia. The relatively low percentage of students that perceive globalization as a threat may reflect a limited influence of the anti-globalization discourse on IR students. Students' comments on their answers can be summarized as follows:

The first group of respondents reason that globalization is an opportunity because it allows Indonesia to cultivate good relations with other countries, to extend its influence in the international arena, and to pursue economic, political, and technological development. It can also contribute to the improvement of education, creativity and new ways of thinking. For the second group, however, globalization is perceived as a threat because it is associated with the exploitation of natural resources, capitalism, consumerism, as well as other alien ideas and values that could result in the erosion of local cultures and even the *Pancasila* ideology. Others note that whether globalization is an opportunity or a threat depends on Indonesia's readiness and effectiveness in managing the impact of globalization.

### *Indonesia's important Others*

According to the students' responses to question no. 32 (Please rank the importance of the countries or regions below for Indonesia, 1 being the most important, 10 being the least important) in Table 15, ASEAN is by far the most important Other in Indonesia's foreign relations (ranked first by 48.4% of the respondents). The association is followed by the US and China – two major powers in Asia and the Pacific region. These responses are in line with those to question no. 2 (What problem or topic of IR are you interested in? You may choose up to four topics), where Southeast Asian Studies, European Studies and American Studies are ranked second, fourth and fifth as topics of interest.<sup>27</sup> To some extent, these

<sup>27</sup> Ranked first is human rights and human security, which is identified by 125 students. Southeast Asian Studies (109), conventional security (97), European studies (96), American studies (80) and Middle-East studies (75) come second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth respectively in the ranking.

responses may be seen as an indication of the *ligaran konsentris* approach that has been promoted by the Indonesian government, and increasing media reports on ASEAN-related themes, following the regional decision to establish an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015.

*Table 15: Indonesia's most important Others  
Percentage of respondents' identification*

<b>Actors</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
ASEAN	48.4	7.9	12.3	4.3	5.8
US	20.6	17.7	11.6	12.3	9.0
China	15.9	28.2	19.1	14.1	6.9
Australia	4.0	10.1	11.2	13.0	14.1
Japan	3.6	6.9	17.7	16.6	17.7
EU	1.8	10.8	11.6	12.3	15.9
Middle-East	1.4	7.6	5.4	10.1	7.2
South Korea	0.7	0.7	1.4	5.1	7.2
Russia	0.4	4.0	2.9	2.5	5.4
Africa	-	1.4	0.4	1.4	1.1
India	-	1.1	2.2	2.5	4.7
Others	-	-	-	-	0.7
Missing Data	3.2	3.6	4.3	5.8	4.3

## Concluding remarks

The wide range of items identified as associated with the West suggests fluid meanings of “the West” which is built upon a broad network of signification. Although repeated identifications of items such as America, liberalism, development and democracy, capitalism, modernity, technology, Europe, and colonization, may reflect some levels of intersubjectivity, the data suggests that there is indeed little agreement over a definite meaning of the West. America and other frequently mentioned items (liberalism, development and democracy) are also identified by more or less one-third of the respondents. The level of intersubjectivity is significantly higher when the respondents are asked to identify countries and regions that belong to the West. As a vague category and (imagined) reality, however, the West may indeed depend heavily on the intersubjective identification of the actors (either regions or countries), which constitute the West in the first place.

Second, the images of the West differ significantly across topical themes and issue-areas. In terms of cooperation, although the West is perceived as most cooperative in the areas of international trade and democratization, it is seen as least cooperative in environmental issues and the management of financial crisis. The perceived lack of cooperation in the latter two areas, however, do not prevent the majority of the respondents from considering the EU model of regional integration and Western economic and technological development as inspirations for Indonesia and ASEAN. On the one hand, the reception of the idea that the West should be a model for national and regional development may be seen as a reflection of the normative influence of the West on the respondents' perception of Indonesia's national development and region-building. On the other hand, the EU may be regarded as an expression of late modernity, which at least in theory is characterized by transnationalized legal, political, economic and cultural relations (unlike the Westphalian

world of nation-states) (Walker 2012: 57-9). This raises the question of whether the students' attraction to the EU model signifies current tensions between increasingly transnationalized economic and cultural relations of contemporary Southeast Asia and the attempt to retain the modern system based on sovereign states. If it does, this could reflect anxiety among the students, over what form of politics would emerge from a negotiation between supporters of economic and cultural transformations of the region and forces that seek to maintain the status quo, as it moved towards late modernity.

These questions are closely related to the third issue derived from the results above, regarding the construction of a modern Indonesian state. The naming of Soekarno and Hatta as well as the domination of *bebas-aktif*, *diplomasi perjuangan*, *ketahanan nasional* and *wawasan nusantara* in the respondents' perceptions all support the argument that the current views about Indonesia's security and foreign relations have remained largely influenced by the history of (de)colonization and the need to construct a strong unitary nation-state of Indonesia. This also explains why *Pancasila* and multiculturalism are the first and second most favored international identities of the country, instead of a clear religious or non-religious identity such as Islam or secularism. More importantly, this ideology has been invoked by Indonesia leaders rather frequently. During the Soeharto era, the period when the respondents were born and raised, the *Pancasila* was propagated as part of a strategy to suppress religious opposition. The more recent revival of the idea was in the mid-2000, when radical Muslim groups sought the implementation of sharia law across the country. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono stated clearly that *Pancasila* should remain the basis for Indonesia's reform, unity and identity (Witula 2006).

Fourth, there exists an ambiguous relevance of realist theories in terms of prediction and influence. This ambiguity arises from the fact that although most of the respondents identify Political Realism as their favored paradigm, and acknowledge Western domination and the vulnerability of Indonesia in international politics, the Realist views and perceived asymmetric power relations do not generally lead to a threatening image of the West and a perception of negative Indonesia-West relations as the theories would predict.<sup>28</sup> As demonstrated in Table 4 above, Indonesia's relations with Australia, the EU and the US are perceived mainly as neutral and positive. This is also true in the case of China-Indonesia relations. This suggests that the image and identification of other actors as a threat or enemy in international politics may indeed depend on other factors than the perception of power relations and theoretical preferences.

Fifth, the West, as a term, was constructed and included in the socio-political lexicon long before the establishment of IR as an academic discipline. As the term has been used widely to refer to a cultural and political entity by politicians, journalists, and academics at both the local and international levels, the respondents most likely have learned and had certain images of the West prior to their university education. Hence, it is not surprising that other media, such as internet, TV, films and newspapers are identified as important sources of the students' knowledge about the West. In short, the role of IR in the production of knowledge about the West is limited to only knowledge about the West in international politics. And as many IR scholars depend on the media for their research, many of these scholars may reproduce the knowledge, at least partly, that is already circulated by media.

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28 The Realist concepts of "balance of power" and "security dilemma" (Waltz 1979), for instance, suggest that the perception of asymmetric power relations would lead to a threaten image of the greater power and lead to an attempt to balance such power.

Sixth, although democracy is not regarded as the most favored international identity of Indonesia, it has been constructed as part of Indonesia's cultural self since independence. At least in theory, the idea of democracy is included in the fourth principle of *Pancasila*. As officially stated, Indonesia's democracy is to be "guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives."<sup>29</sup> Soekarno and other Indonesian leaders propagated deliberation (or *permusyawaratan*) as a cultural heritage of consensus-seeking, which set Indonesia apart from the "fifty percent plus one" democracy of the West. Thus, by definition, *Pancasila*-based democracy is significantly different from Western liberal democracy, which was based on majority voting.<sup>30</sup> The result of this survey (question no. 26), however, demonstrates that more than half of the respondents (about 60%) have now adopted the adjective "liberal," which was at least in principle foreign to them, for Indonesia's democracy. But whether this adoption suggests a qualitative change in terms of perception towards democracy, as a political system based on liberal ideals such as self-determination, human rights and the rule of law, remains debatable. While further qualitative examination is certainly required, preliminary results suggest that there is indeed a change in terms of self-identification. This may be a result of Indonesia's democratic transition and the associated discursive re-construction of its politico-cultural identity over the course of the past decade. This change may also be attributed to the emergence of the notions such as "deliberative democracy" and "consensus democracy,"<sup>31</sup> in Political Science at the international level, which serves to blur the line between the Indonesian and Western liberal democracies in the eyes of the respondents.<sup>32</sup>

Seventh, the perception of the majority of respondents that corruption is currently the most serious threat to Indonesia may, as already noted, reflect a disparity between the governmental and state-centric academic discourses on security on the one hand, and the actual public perception and understanding of security on the other. While the problems of terrorism, and corruption (together with collusion and nepotism known as *KKN*) are identified in Indonesia's Defense White Paper (*Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia*) 2003, corruption has been largely omitted from the academic and mainstream discussions of national security. The identification of corruption should be seen as a result of the daily reports on corruption cases and the prioritization of anti-corruption within the reformation and democratization discourses in the past 16 years. Although the shifting security attention to corruption may be seen as a purely domestic phenomenon, it coincides with an emerging intellectual attempt to link corruption to global security and world order at the international level.<sup>33</sup>

Eighth, although *lingaran konsentris* is second to *bebas-aktif* and *diplomacy perjuangan*, and other foreign policy principles in Table 9, data in Table 15 demonstrate that the students'

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29 "Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, Dalam Permusyawaratan dan Perwakilan" It must be noted that although the term *kerakyatan* is often translated to "democracy", it can also be translated as "peoplehood," or people-centredness.

30 Mohammad Hatta also shared this view, seeing the process of deliberation and the spirit of *gotong royong* at the village levels as the essence of "Indonesian democracy" (Rose 2010, 299)

31 See, for example, Bessette (1994), Klosko (2000) and Lijphart (2002).

32 *Demokrasi deliberatif* (deliberative democracy) and *demokrasi konsensus* (consensus democracy) are widely discussed by Indonesian scholars and politicians. Many also refer to *permusyawaratan* and the fourth principle of *pancasila* (Latif 2011, Skalanews 2013).

33 Rothberg (2009, vii), for instance, argues that corruption is among the most important destabilizing factors. It lies the center of global anxieties and contributes significantly to the collapse of macroeconomic stability as well as the problems of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

perceptions may indeed be influenced by *lingaran konsentris*. ASEAN, the cornerstone of *lingaran konsentris*, is seen by almost half of the students as the most important strategic Other in Indonesia's foreign relations. Second and third are the US and China, both of which are in principle located within the second circle of *lingaran konsentris*. Most of the countries and regions in the lower ranks are also part of this circle (MFA Indonesia 2009).

In sum, this study examines political perceptions of students who are directly exposed to the production of knowledge within the discipline of IR in Indonesia. As part of a broader investigation of the concepts of the West in Asia, it provides important pieces of information on the respondents' ideas about the West and about Indonesia's security and foreign relations. Data and information presented here may be incorporated in further examinations of political debates and policy discourses of Indonesia. A similar set of survey questions may also be used to study the images of the Others and perceptions of Selves in other Southeast Asian countries. This will allow for a comparative study of ideas and worldviews that exist in many part of Southeast Asia and, at least in part, constitute the region as a whole.

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## Appendix I

Umur: \_\_\_\_\_

Jenis kelamin:             laki-laki             perempuan

Agama: \_\_\_\_\_

Provinsi asal: \_\_\_\_\_

Suku: \_\_\_\_\_

Bahasa apa yang paling sering digunakan?:

Bahasa Indonesia

Inggris

lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )

Kota tempat anda menempuh pendidikan (SD–SMA): \_\_\_\_\_

Tahun keberapa di Universitas:  pertama

kedua

ketiga

keempat

S2

lain-lain

1. Koran apa atau website online apa yang biasa Anda baca?

tidak baca

Kompas

Tempo

Jakarta Post

detiknews.com

lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )

2. Masalah atau topik politik apa dalam HI yang menarik buat Anda? Anda bisa memilih sampai empat topik.

- Kajian wilayah Asia Tenggara
- Kajian wilayah Amerika
- Kajian wilayah Eropa
- Kajian wilayah Timor Tengah
- Demokrasi/Demokratisasi
- Hak Asasi Manusia/keamanan insani
- keamanan konvensional (kedaulatan militer, dll.)
- Politik Lingkungan Hidup
- Geopolitik (misalnya masalah perbatasan)
- Agama
- Gender
- lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )

3. Ketika Anda mendengar atau melihat kata “dunia Barat” lima hal apa yang Anda pikirkan?

(1) \_\_\_\_\_

(2) \_\_\_\_\_

(3) \_\_\_\_\_

(4) \_\_\_\_\_

(5) \_\_\_\_\_

4. Tolong sebutkan negara-negara atau wilayah yang menurut Anda termasuk dunia Barat.

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

5. Apakah dunia Barat merupakan peluang atau ancaman untuk Indonesia?

ancaman

peluang

tidak pasti

Tolong jelaskan secara singkat: \_\_\_\_\_

6. Menurut anda, di bidang apakah negara Barat paling kooperatif untuk bekerjasama? Tolong urutkan 3 bidang dimana negara-negara Barat paling kooperatif? (1 paling kooperatif, 2 kurang kooperatif, 3 paling tidak kooperatif)

- militer
- terorisme
- pemeliharaan perdamaian
- perdagangan
- manajemen krisis keuangan
- hak asasi manusia/keamanan manusia (Human Security)
- demokratisasi
- lingkungan hidup (perubahan iklim, kebakaran hutan dan lahan, dll.)
- lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )

7. Menurut Anda, dalam bidang apa saja negara Barat paling tidak bisa diajak kerjasama?

- militer
- terorisme
- pemeliharaan perdamaian
- perdagangan
- manajemen krisis keuangan
- hak asasi manusia
- demokratisasi
- lingkungan hidup (perubahan iklim, kebakaran hutan dan lahan, dll.)
- lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )

8. "ASEAN seharusnya mengikuti model integrasi Uni Eropa." Apakah Anda setuju dengan pernyataan ini?

ya                       tidak                       ya, dengan penyesuaian

9. Apakah Anda berpendapat bahwa dunia Barat bisa menjadi model untuk perkembangan ekonomi Indonesia?

ya                                       tidak

10. Apakah Anda berpendapat bahwa dunia Barat bisa menjadi model untuk perkembangan teknologi Indonesia?  
 ya  tidak
11. Secara umum, bagaimana Anda menilai hubungan antara Indonesia dengan Amerika Serikat?  
 sangat bagus  bagus  biasa saja  buruk  sangat buruk
12. Secara umum, bagaimana Anda menilai hubungan antara Indonesia dan Uni Eropa?  
 sangat bagus  bagus  biasa saja  buruk  sangat buruk
13. Secara umum, bagaimana Anda menilai hubungan antara Indonesia dan Australia?  
 sangat bagus  bagus  biasa saja  buruk  sangat buruk
14. Secara umum, bagaimana Anda menilai hubungan antara Indonesia dan Cina?  
 sangat bagus  bagus  biasa saja  buruk  sangat buruk
15. Apakah Anda berpendapat bahwa politik internasional sekarang ini didominasi oleh negara-negara Barat?  
 ya  tidak  tidak yakin
16. Dari sumber-sumber apa pengetahuan Anda mengenai dunia Barat?  
 koran  
 TV  
 film  
 internet  
 musik  
 pengalaman pribadi (interaksi langsung, perjalanan)  
 sekolah  
 ruang kuliah (tolong sebutkan mata kuliah apa: \_\_\_\_\_ )  
 lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )
17. Berasal dari sumber-sumber apa saja pengetahuan Anda tentang politik internasional? Tolong urutkan dalam skala 1 sampai 5 (1 yang paling penting, 5 yang paling tidak penting).  
\_\_\_\_ koran

\_\_\_ TV

\_\_\_ film

\_\_\_ ruang kuliah (tolong sebutkan mata kuliah apa: \_\_\_\_\_ )

\_\_\_ lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )

18. Teori-teori atau paradigma-paradigma hubungan internasional apa yang menurut Anda paling pas/bagus menjelaskan hubungan internasional dan politik internasional? (Jika jawaban Anda lebih dari satu tolong jelaskan secara singkat mengapa)

Realisme

Liberalisme

Konstruktivisme

Feminisme

Marxisme

Post-strukturalisme

Post-modernisme

lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )

Komentar singkat: \_\_\_\_\_

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19. Menurut Anda siapa politisi Indonesia yang paling berpengaruh dalam hubungan internasional Indonesia? Jika jawaban Anda lebih dari satu tolong urutkan tiga politisi yang paling berpengaruh (1 adalah yang paling berpengaruh, 2 kurang berpengaruh, 3 paling tidak berpengaruh)

Soekarno

Mohammad Hatta

Sutan Sjahrir

H. Agus Salim

Abdurrahman Wahid

Ali Alatas

*Hasyim Djalal*

*Tan Malaka*

*Soebandrio*

lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )

20. Menurut Anda siapa ilmuwan hubungan internasional yang paling berpengaruh di Indonesia?

Anak Agung Banyu Perwita

Juwono Sudarsono

Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Hariyadi Wirawan



- pertahanan melingkar
- wawasan nusantara
- ketahanan nasional
- sistem pertahanan dan keamanan rakyat semesta
- lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )

25. Apakah menurut Anda yang menjadi identitas internasional Indonesia? Jika jawaban Anda lebih dari satu tolong urutkan tiga prinsip yang paling penting (1 paling penting, 2 kurang penting, 3 paling tidak penting).

- Islam
- Pancasila
- multikulturalisme
- lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )
- demokrasi
- sekularisme
- kekuatan baru dari Asia

26. Apakah menurut Anda “demokrasi liberal” adalah bagian dari budaya Indonesia?

- ya
- tidak

27. Jika jawaban Anda untuk pertanyaan 26 adalah tidak, sistem politik apa yang kira-kira diinginkan/cocok untuk Indonesia?

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28. Prinsip-prinsip apa menurut Anda yang harus menjadi dasar bernegara di Indonesia?

- Musyawarah– Mufakat
- multikulturalisme
- lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )
- Negara kesatuan
- gotong royong/kekeluargaan

29. Menurut Anda, masalah keamanan atau ancaman apa yang paling serius dihadapi Indonesia? Jika jawaban Anda lebih dari satu tolong urutkan tiga ancaman yang paling penting ( skala 1 sampai 5, 1 paling penting, 5 paling tidak penting).

- terorisme
- globalisasi
- korupsi
- Malaysia
- pelanggaran hak asasi manusia
- disintegrasi nasional
- bencana alam
- intervensi negara adidaya
- Australia
- lain-lain (tolong sebutkan: \_\_\_\_\_ )

30. Apakah menurut Anda Indonesia rentan terhadap pengaruh Barat?

ya                       tidak

31. Tolong jelaskan jawaban Anda untuk pertanyaan 30 secara singkat.

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32. Tolong urutkan pentingnya negara-negara dan wilayah di bawah ini untuk Indonesia (1 yang paling penting, 10 yang paling tidak penting)

\_\_\_ Australia    \_\_\_ Afrika    \_\_\_ ASEAN  
\_\_\_ Cina        \_\_\_ Uni Eropa    \_\_\_ India  
\_\_\_ Jepang     \_\_\_ Korea       \_\_\_ Timur Tengah  
\_\_\_ Russia      \_\_\_ US           \_\_\_ lain-lain, tolong sebutkan.....

Komentar singkat: \_\_\_\_\_

33. Apakah Anda melihat globalisasi sebagai peluang atau ancaman untuk Indonesia? Tolong jelaskan secara singkat.

peluang                       ancaman

Komentar singkat: \_\_\_\_\_

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Economics: [www.vwl.uni-freiburg.de/iwipol/sopo.htm](http://www.vwl.uni-freiburg.de/iwipol/sopo.htm)